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The Development of Social Enterprise and Rise of
Benefit Corporations: A Global Solution?
Dina Dalessandro*

I. INTRODUCTION
This note seeks to analyze the benefits, as well as shortfalls of social
enterprises, alongside the development of state legislation supporting them.
Social enterprises at their core are business ventures intentionally designed
to affect a societal good or benefit.1 In doing so, social enterprises have
transformed the landscape of the corporate law, as they arguably require an
expansion of corporate governance. In fact, the benefit corporation model
implicates a profound change from the traditional form. This is because in
order to pursue a public good or benefit, these socially-driven companies
may require directors and officers of the corporation to make business
decisions which may diverge from the traditional goal of profit
maximization.2 The benefit corporation, in turn, seeks to better align
decision-making and allow corporate officers and directors to pursue profitmaximization and public good. Moreover, numerous case studies of
successful companies, such as Patagonia, show that the two need not be
mutually exclusive.3
In an effort to support social enterprises many states have developed
benefit corporation legislation. Today, thirty-four states have passed such
statutes.4
As such, the social enterprise movement and benefit
corporations, as their vehicle, can pose a valuable solution to many of the
problems that traditional corporations have posed to society. Notably, the
mounting criticism of corporate greed has provided support for the
development of social enterprise. Through analysis of this new business
model, it will become clear that benefit corporations can provide a potential
solution to many important global problems, such as promoting sustainable

* J.D. Candidate at the University of California Hastings, Class of 2019.
1. Alina S. Ball, Social Enterprise Governance, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 919, 921 (2016).
2. Id.
3. See generally Haskell J. Murray, Defending Patagonia: Mergers & Acquisitions with Benefit
Corporations, 9 HASTINGS BUS L.J. 485 (2013).
4. State By State Status of Legislation, THE BENEFIT CORPORATION, http://benefitcorp.net/policy
makers/state-by-state-status [perma.cc/V8Y4-MM5Q].
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development and environmental protection. The continued growth of the
social enterprise movement can be supported by the creation of the benefit
corporation statues. However, to advance movement, as a whole, more
support is needed from the bottom-up. Garnering greater demand from the
market, will require the government and even Wall Street to accept this
new corporate form and the social impact business model. In turn, social
enterprises may seek to garner greater market support and investment, and
perhaps even government funding in the form of tax breaks, to guarantee
their growth and ultimately, their success. With this monetary and societal
investment, then, the benefit corporation may become an effective solution
to the problematic aspects that the traditional corporate model has posed.

II. SOCIAL ENTERPRISE DEFINED
The Social Enterprise Alliance, an organization which provides a
platform for the social enterprise movement,5 defines social enterprises as
“organizations that address a basic unmet need or solve a social or
environmental problem through a market-drive approach.”6 Ultimately,
social enterprises are “triple-bottom-line” organizations which seek to
balance profit, social impact, and environmental sustainability.7 Notably, a
social enterprise can be both a non-profit or a traditional corporation, but
this paper will be focused solely on the corporate model. Social enterprises
allow for a company to integrate a social impact or benefit into its business
operations.8 In doing so, they have attempted to address a variety of social
issues from poverty to maintaining environmental resources. Some wellknown social enterprises include: Grameen Bank, which makes small loans
for small business development; Warby Parker, which makes a contribution
to non-profit Vision Spring for every pair sold; and Terra Cycle, which
recycles packaging and consumer waste into new products, keeping it out
of landfills.9 Indeed, the growth of social enterprise in the past ten years is
a reflection on the need and demand for greater social responsibility and
sustainability in business practices.

5. About SEA, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE ALLIANCE, https://socialenterprise.us/about/what-we-do/
[perma.cc/7FSJ-HLLG].
6. What
is
Social
Enterprise?,
SOCIAL
ENTERPRISE
ALLIANCE,
https://socialenterprise.us/about/social-enterprise/ [perma.cc/MKP3-KDMF].
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See id.
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III. THE RISE OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE
Alongside the development of social enterprise has been the public
outcry against the traditional corporate model and the accumulation of
wealth in only a small portion of the population. The frustration of the
American public can be seen in the uprising of socially liberal platforms, as
seen in Bernie Sanders’ 2016 campaign for President. Sanders ran on the
platform that millions of Americans are working longer hours for lower
wages, while the wealthy top one percent and largest corporations are
growing and getting richer.10 Part of this, Sanders claims, is the way
corporations are designed and the way they function to help and benefit
only the shareholders and the top executives.11
Notably, the traditional corporate model is designed with the primary
goal of shareholder wealth maximization. In more recent years, however,
corporations have been criticized by both the public and their own
shareholders for misusing corporate funds, high executive compensation,
and unsustainable business practices. This criticism has fueled a global
movement against social inequality and the destruction of our global
environment and nature resources, and ultimately pushed for better
corporate oversight.
Moreover, the 2008 economic crisis serves as evidence of the dangers
of the comingling between Wall Street and large multinational corporations
and the government. The 2008 crash is said to be the result of capitalistic
corporate greed, the growth of privatization, and the lack of government
regulation.12 Ultimately, the 2008 economic crisis led to a global protest of
the corporate form and the growing culture of corporate greed.13 A
movement that quickly spread globally began in the United States and
Canada in 2011, and was coined “Occupy Wall Street,” transformed into a
protest against the role of Wall Street in creating the economic collapse.
The “Occupy” movement sought to fight back against the richest one

10. Bernie Sanders, The Corporate Greed Must End, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (June 24, 2016),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-bernie-sanders/corporate-greed-must-end_b_7653442.html
[perma.cc/BY2E-LSSG].
11. Id.
12. Charles Ferguson, The Inside Job, (2010), http://www.sonyclassics.com/insidejob/site/#/
synopsis [perma.cc/6QMT-XB4B].
13. Davis Randall, Davis & Mark Thomas, , Across the World, the indigent rise up against
corporate
greed,
THE
INDEPENDENT
(Oct.
15,
2011),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/across-the-world-the-indignant-rise-up-againstcorporate-greed-and-cuts-2371357.html [perma.cc/WD3Q-Y3P6]; Edith Honan and Edward
McAllister, Thousands protest banks, corporate greed in US marches, REUTERS (Oct. 14, 2011),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-wallstreet-protests/thousands-protest-banks-corporate-greed-inu-s-marches-idUSTRE79A41E20111015 [perma.cc/92QA-XKFA].
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percent of people, which are “writing the rules of unfair global economy.”14
The movement sustained itself as an effort to fight against the power of
major banks and multinational corporations over the democratic process.15
Notably, it spread across Asia, Europe, and the Middle-east and led to
protests in 1,500 cities across the world, fully exposing the lack of trust and
confidence of the public in the democratic process and in capitalism on a
global scale.16
The Edelman Trust Barometer, a yearly trust and credibility survey,
which aims to measure the populations trust in business, government,
NGOs and media on a global scale, reveals that “trust is in crisis around the
world,” in its most recent study.17 The report indicates that a majority of
respondents believe that the overall system is not working for them, stating
that people’s societal and economic concerns, including globalization, the
pace of innovation and eroding social values, turn into fears, spurring the
rise of populist actions now playing out in several Western-style
democracies.18 They claim that in order rebuild trust and faith in the
system, institutions must step outside of their traditional roles and work
toward a new, more integrated operating model that puts people at the
center of everything they do.19 This where social enterprise comes into
play.
Likewise, commentators have noted that social enterprises may
provide a solution to many of the inequalities that capitalism has created.
Notably, Majorie Kelly, author of the book The Divine Right of Capital,20
argues many of the problems created by corporate America, such as wealth
inequality and pollution can be traced to corporate law.21 Conventional
corporate structures and the corporate model itself require operation solely
in the interest of their owners, an idea known as “shareholder primacy”, the
theory that shareholder interest should be assigned priority to all other
corporate stakeholders. Social enterprises challenge the shareholder
primacy norm by requiring corporate boards to think about another
constituency: the public. The development of constituency statutes and
14. OCCUPY WALL STREET (Aug. 27, 2016), http://occupywallst.org/about/ [perma.cc/3PE657RN].
15. See id.
16. OCCUPY WALL STREET, supra note 14.
17. EDELMAN TRUST, Global Results, (Jan. 17, 2017), https://www.edelman.com/global-results/
[perma.cc/YJN6-FYAS].
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See generally KELLY MAJORIE, THE DIVINE RIGHT TO CAPITAL: DETHRONING THE
CORPORATE ARISTOCRACY (Berret-Koehler Publishers, 2001).
21. Mark Gunther, Will Wall Street Embrace B Corps, B THE CHANGE (Mar. 31, 2017), https://
bthechange.com/will-wall-street-embrace-b-corps-5df5c91c4f4a [perma.cc/6VPD-A3LT].
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public benefit corporation statues has allowed corporations and directors to
do more than just seek profits and thus has eliminated the profit
maximization norm. Moreover, the statutes require a business to pursue
profits in a sustainable way, for the environment and society at large.
Therefore, this rise of social enterprises may provide a solution to the
downfalls and problems created by the traditional corporate model.

IV. DEVELOPMENT OF STATE LEGISLATION
A.

THE TRADITIONAL CORPORATE MODEL

Proponents of social enterprise and benefit corporation legislation
have focused on landmark cases Dodge v. Ford and eBay v. Newmark,22 as
evidence of why new corporate statutes should exist. The notion that
corporations have a purpose beyond creating financial gain for its
shareholders is remarkably novel. The Court in Dodge v. Ford,23
articulated that “a business corporation is organized and carried on
primarily for the profit of stockholders.”24 For the past hundred years,
courts diligently followed this proposition. The Michigan Supreme Court
famously ordered Ford to make a cash distribution to its shareholders
despite his claim that he wished to use the excess capital in the corporation
to benefit society.25 Dodge famously involved a minority shareholder suit
by the Dodge brothers, who claimed Ford failed to maximize shareholder
value.26 The fact that Ford stated he wanted to maximize something other
than profit maximization made it impossible for the court to afford him the
traditional business judgment deference accorded to directors. 27
In the more recent eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 28 the
Delaware Court reaffirmed the primacy of wealth maximization.29 The
case involved a dispute between Craig Newmark and James Buckmaster,
the majority shareholders and directors of Craigslist, and eBay.30 Although
technically a for-profit corporation, Craigslist sought to operate its business
22. Murray, supra note 3, at 510.
23. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. at 668 (Mich. 1919).
24. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. at 684; see also Elizabeth K. Babson & William H.
Clark, How Benefit Corporations are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 825 (2012).
25. Murray, supra note 3, at 493.
26. Michael Thomas, Why Kickstarter Decided to Radically Change its Business Model, FAST
COMPANY (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/3068547/why-kickstarter-decided-to-radica
lly-transform-its-business-model [perma.cc/8B36-AUHV].
27. Leo E. Strine, Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek
Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 147–48 (2012).
28. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
29. Babson & Clark, supra note 24, at 827–28; see also Murray, supra note 3, at 491–93.
30. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).

Summer 2019

SOCIAL ENTERPRISE AND BENEFIT CORPORATIONS

299

largely as a community service, allowing users to post classified
advertisements free of charge, thus profit-maximizing was not the primary
goal.31 The dispute arose when it became clear that eBay hoped to acquire
Craigslist as a subsidiary. Newmark and Buckmaster opposed the
monetization of the site, preferring to keep to its unique culture and
community service roots, thus adopted a rights plan as a defensive measure.32
In response, eBay sued, alleging that Newmark and Buckmaster breached their
duties as majority shareholders.33 The Court evaluated whether Newmark and
Buckmaster’s claim that eBay’s takeover would threaten the values, culture
and business model of Craigslist was a viable reason to prevent the takeover.34
Ultimately the Court found that Craigslist was not warranted to put a defensive
mechanism in place to prevent the takeover and that doing so would violate the
shareholder’s wealth maximization, which is the primacy of a fiduciary’s
duties. Subsequently, eBay has been cited as reason why directors need a
mechanism to support company goals which may fall outside the profitmaximization norm. As such, benefit corporation legislation was created
largely in response to the eBay problem and with the justification that it can
create protection for corporation’s in the event of a takeover.
Unilever’s takeover of Ben & Jerry’s is yet another justification for
why companies need benefit corporation statutes.35 Ben & Jerry’s
Homemade, Inc. was a for-profit corporation that pursued a “double bottom
line,” seeking to advance progressive social goals, while at the same
yielding financial returns for investors.36 It advanced its social mission in
many ways: committing 7.5% of its profits to a charitable foundation;
conducting in-store voter registration; and buying ingredients from
suppliers who employed disadvantaged populations.”37 However in 2000
Ben & Jerry’s was acquired by Unilever, a large multi-national company
which was only focused on profit maximization and abandoned the many
social initiatives Ben & Jerry’s had once pursued.38 In this way, Ben &
Jerry’s is “a case study for the perils of maintaining a social mission in a
publicly-traded corporate form.”39 In fact, the proponents of benefit
corporation legislation firmly believe that social enterprises require the
support of a statute in order to successfully pursue both its social motive or
31. Babson & Clark, supra note 24, at 827–28.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1.
35. Murray, supra note 3, at 503-04.
36. Robert Katz & Antony Page, Freezing Out Ben & Jerry: Corporate Law and the Sale of a
Social Enterprise Icon, 35 VT. L. REV. 211, 212 (2010).
37. Id. at 211.
38. Id. at 211–12.
39. Id. at 212.
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public benefit and to produce a profit.
B.

DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUENCY STATUTES

Constituency statutes allow directors to consider the constituencies of
groups other than shareholders. Arguably, constituency statutes were
developed as a defensive mechanism for companies that were subject to
hostile takeovers and to provide protection to a target company’s board, by
giving them the discretion to reject a hostile takeover based on its
consideration of constituencies other than shareholders.40 Thus, the
directors of these businesses are explicitly given the ability to consider
people other than their shareholders. This allowed businesses pursing a
social mission the tools to do so, without being sued. While directors of
mission-driven companies could now consider the interest of various
constituencies, not all states adopted these statutes. Most notably,
Delaware did not. The lack of case law and the fact that corporate law was
still dominated by Delaware, led to little success in the interpretation and
use of these statutes.41 Furthermore, the statues are only permissive, and
while they give directors the option to consider other constituencies, there
is no requirement.42 While the constituency statutes provided for a shift in
corporate law, allowing the consideration of issues outside of shareholder
wealth maximization, they required no commitment on behalf of directors,
nor did they require accountability.43
C.

B LAB AND THE B CORP

The new millennium fostered a great deal of entrepreneurialism for
social purpose. In 2006, the nonprofit organization, “B Lab,” established a
way to change the business world.44
B Lab sought to provide
accountability and oversight for businesses that wished to pursue a public
benefit.45 A for-profit corporation could show its commitment to social
motive by becoming a registered “B Corp,” registering and submitting to
monitoring by B Lab. B Lab monitors social enterprises by requiring them
to maintain standards for social and environmental performance,
accountability and transparency; if the standards are met, then B Lab will

40. Babson & Clark, supra note 24, at 829.
41. Id. at 831.
42. Id. at 832.
43. Benefit Corporation, Benefit Corporations are Necessary, http://benefitcorp.net/attorneys/
benefit-corporations-are-necessary [perma.cc/BG5C-PR4M].
44. B Lab, About B Lab, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/about-b-lab [perma.cc/
P96E-Z6WW].
45. Id.

Summer 2019

SOCIAL ENTERPRISE AND BENEFIT CORPORATIONS

301

offer its certification status.46
B Lab was founded by the former founders and executives of footwear
brand, AND1, Bart Houlahan and Andrew Kassoy, after they watched their
company deteriorate in the shadows of Nike.47 While AND1 reached
revenue of $250 million in 2001, they were ultimately forced to sell the
company in 2006.48 Before the sale, they had given their employees
generous parental leave benefits and equity in the company; donated five
percent of their profits to charity, and they enforced strict rules on their
overseas suppliers to ensure fair wages and safety.49 As soon as they lost
control of the company, all of that was stripped away. With the
establishment of B Lab, their mission was to help usher in a new era of
corporate governance where companies did right by shareholders and the
world around them simultaneously.50 As of this publication, there are 2,778
registered B Corps across 150 industries, which B Lab monitors, making
this innovation a huge success for the founders.
However, many propositioned that these new companies designed and
motivated by a social purpose could not be sustained on the traditional
corporate statutes and then simply certified to be effective. Moreover, the
traditional corporate model arguably did not have the necessary oversight
and regulatory mechanism to allow social enterprises to be both successful
and effective,51 even with help from B Lab.
As such, a community of academics, entrepreneurs, and lawyers,
urged for more robust monitoring and governance in the creation and
maintenance of social enterprises.
It is against the paradigm of shareholder primacy that benefit
corporations have been drafted. These statues address not only
the need for a new corporate form, but also respond to the
demand from the market place for a corporate form that meets
the needs and expectation of increasingly socially and
environmentally conscious consumers, investors, and
entrepreneurs.52
The push for a new and unique variation of the traditional corporation
46. Jonathon Storper, What’s the Difference Between a B Corp and a Benefit Corporation,
CONSCIOUS COMPANY MEDIA (Apr. 4, 2015), https://consciouscompanymedia.com/sustainablebusiness/whats-the-difference-between-a-b-corp-and-a-benefit-corporation. [perma.cc/L9NS-9U9P].
47. See Thomas, supra note 26.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See generally Ball, supra note 1.
52. Babson & Clark, supra note 24, at 838.
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led to the development of the unique benefit corporation. The B Lab
founders played a large role in developing legislation and lobbying states to
pass new statutes. Jonathon Storper, a corporate attorney in the Bay Area’s
office of Hanson Bridgett, was one of the initial drafters of California’s
benefit corporation legislation.53 Storper expressed the challenges he faced
with getting the law passed in California, as the first effort was vetoed by
then Governor Schwarzenegger.54
Storper worked with two other
California corporate attorneys and colleagues, John Montgomery and
Donald Simon, as well as B Lab to lobby politicians and develop what they
called a social purpose bill, which would in effect allow corporations to
pursue a mission outside of the typical profit-maximization goals of
traditional corporations.55 Part of the battle, Storper explained, included
getting around conservative business interests who feared that such
legislation would impose social and environmental obligations on them.56
Even more, Storper explained that people fear change and this new type of
statute was daunting to both the business and legal world.57 In fact, many
lawyers, scholars and businesses were hesitant to take on this new
corporate form.
Some of the initial criticism stemmed from the fact that the legislation
created an entirely new type of corporation, while the traditional model had
been widely accepted for the past hundred years. Well-respected Chief
Justice Strine, of the Delaware Supreme Court, has suggested that the
benefit corporation is really modest in the evolution of the corporate
model.58 Even going so far to state that “those who believe that corporate
law must make stockholder welfare the sole end of corporate governance
are simply wrong and have misread the precedent.”59
Indeed, since its formation, the benefit corporation has met a great
deal criticism and reluctance. However, many initial fears and criticisms
subsided by the overall successes that these statutes provided. In fact,
supporters of the benefit corporation argue that it has been effective
because it provides for reduced director liability, expanded stockholder
rights, an advantage in attracting and retaining talent, increased access to
certain private investment capital, increased attractiveness to retail
investors, and mission protection, to name a few.60
53. In-person interview with Jonathon Storper, Law Partner, Hanson Bridgett (Nov. 6, 2017).
54. Id.
55. Gunther, supra note 21.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Leo E. Strine, Making it Easier for Directors To “Do the Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. 235, 242 (2014).
59. Id.
60. FAQ, BENEFIT CORPORATION, http://benefitcorp.net/faq [perma.cc/X2MU-ZWLH].
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BENEFIT CORPORATION STATUTES

The introduction the benefit corporation statute created a platform that
allowed social entrepreneurs to create a business that pursued both profit
and a social or environmental purpose. Most statutes actually require that
the corporation must list a stated purpose in its charter and be designed
provide a “public benefit.”61 While the statutes do tend to differ from state
to state, they have three common requirements: (1) a stated public purpose;
(2) corporate governance scheme, (3) transparency and accountability
enforcement.62
Maryland was the first state to pass such a statute in 2010.63 California
pioneered its own legislation for the benefit corporation in 2011 and
Delaware passed its own version in 2013.64 As noted, thirty-four states
passed benefit corporation statutes and six are “working on it”.65 A few
examples of well-known benefit corporations include Method, Kickstarter,
Plum Organics, King Arthur Flour, Patagonia, Solberg Manufacturing,
Laureate Education and Altschool.66
As mentioned, the benefit corporation model explicitly creates an
established general and specific public benefit.67 In California, the general
public purpose is defined as creating a material positive impact on society
and the environment as a whole, but the statute does not require a benefit
corporation to list a “specific purpose.”68 In Delaware, the statue defines
general public purpose as producing a positive effect or reducing a negative
effect on one or more shareholders.69 These requirements ensure that the
corporation is not only focused toward a narrow cause or interest, but also
on being a good corporate citizen.70 Since a benefit corporation must have
a specific purpose serving the public benefit, it requires some form of
accountability mechanism. Accordingly, directors of benefit corporations
will balance the impact of their decisions not only on its corporate
shareholders but also on their stakeholders, which can even include the
general public or the environment at large.71 As such, a common criticism
61. Jonathon Storper, Being a Public Benefit Corporation in California, Delaware, LAW 360
(Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/980865 [https://perma.cc/R59M-A5EV].
62. See Jeremy Chen, What is a California Benefit Corporation, http://jeremychenlaw.com/whatis-a-california-benefit-corporation/ [perma.cc/JW34-UW8B].
63. FAQ, supra note 60.
64. Storper, supra note 61.
65. State By State, supra note 4.
66. FAQ. supra note 60.
67. Id.
68. Storper, supra note 61.
69. Id.
70. Strine, supra note 58, at 244.
71. FAQ, supra note 60.
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of the benefit corporation is that the decision-making places a large burden
on directors.
In a traditional corporation directors must perform their duties in good
faith and in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.72 This
is typically referred to as the duty of loyalty. Directors of a benefit
corporation not only have that continued obligation, but now they must also
consider the stakeholder interests of employees and customers, as well as
pursue the mission of the corporation faithfully.73 To carry out the missions
of the a social enterprise, a benefit corporation statute will feature built-in
measures for accountability and transparency.74 In most states, this requires
a corporation to create and publish an annual benefit reports that assesses
their overall social impact and performance against a third-party standard.75
Notably, these reports do not need to be certified or audited by a third
party, such as B Lab. However, the reporting mechanism is vital to the
structure of benefit corporations because there is no requirement that they
be independently monitored or certified by a third party, unless stated in
their charter.76 The requirement to measure the corporation’s performance
by determining an overall environmental or social impact in each year is
certainly new for corporations.77 Arguably, this oversight is necessary to
ensure that directors are keep aligned with the designated mission of the
corporation.78
As noted, both the California and Delaware statutes require a
corporation to produce an annual report to their shareholders. Though, the
standards for the report do differ. In California, the report must detail how
the board selected the third-party standard and how the corporation pursued
its general and/or specific public benefit for the year, including what ways
it failed.79 Delaware corporations must provide shareholders with an
overall statement of the objectives and standards adopted by the board and
an assessment of its success during the year.80 The California statute
requires that the annual report is sent to its shareholders within 120 days
following the end of the fiscal year and to post the report on its website.81
However, Delaware does not impose a requirement that the report must be

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Chen, supra note 62.
Id.
Id.
Strine, supra note 58, at 244.
Id.
Storper, supra note 61.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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provided to the public or posted on the website.82 While both statutes
create a mechanism for oversight, it is clear that California’s guidelines are
much tougher, while Delaware’s are more elusive and are criticized as not
imposing strict enough guidelines on these corporations.

V. AN EFFECTIVE SOLUTION TO TRADITIONAL
CORPORATIONS?
Becoming a benefit corporation is fairly simple. If you are a new
business, you can simply incorporate as a benefit corporation in any state
where such legislation has been passed. The procedure for incorporation
will be roughly the same as for a traditional corporation.83 If you have an
existing company, you can elect to become a benefit corporation by
amending your governing documents, with a two-thirds super-majority of
all shareholders. 84
A.

GOVERNANCE PROBLEMS SOLVED?

In a benefit corporation, shareholders retain the same protections that
they have in a traditional corporate model.85 This includes electing the
directors, voting on major corporate transactions, bringing lawsuits, and
demanding to review the company’s books and records.86 Notably,
shareholders of a benefit corporation retain the right to bring a derivative
suit for breach of fiduciary duty.87 In addition, shareholders of benefit
corporations have a private right of action allowing them to enforce the
mission of the corporation.88 A public benefit enforcement proceeding can
be brought by a shareholder, director, or group owning five percent or more
in corporate equity, for a violation of director or officer duties or for failure
to uphold the mission of the corporation.89 However, damages are limited
to injunctive relief, and monetary damages are not available.90

82. Id.
83. Strine, supra note 58, at 243.
84. Id. at 247.
85. Murray, supra note 3 at 489; see also B Lab, Benefit Corporations: Frequently Asked
Questions for Investors, http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/FAQs%20Investors%206_9.pdf.
[perma.cc/H89E-KSWQ].
86. See Murray, supra text accompanying note 3; see also B Lab, Benefit Corporations:
Frequently
Asked
Questions
for
Investors,
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/FAQs%20Investors%206_9.pdf. [perma.cc/LM83-Q2NQ].
87. Strine, supra note 58.
88. Shareholder Duties and Protections, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/investors/share
holder-duties-and-protections [perma.cc/V7A8-S7DG].
89. Id.
90. Id. at “How Does Benefit Corporation Status Affect Liability?”.
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Additionally, a director’s basic duties in a benefit corporation are the
same as those for a general corporation; a director of a benefit corporation
has the formal fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. To satisfy the duty of
care, a director must become fully informed. In a benefit corporation this
means “considering the impact of decisions on a broad array of the
corporation’s stakeholders, rather than just the interests of its
shareholders.”91 The duty of loyalty is same standard for both benefit and
traditional corporations such that a director must not put his or her own
interests before the interests of the corporation.92
Critics argue that even though the director’s duties do not change, they
do expand—in that they require the director to pursue both profit and the
corporation’s mission. In this way, the discretion of the directors is rather
broad because it does not give guidance on implementing the dual motives
of these corporations.93 More simply, the statutes do not explain how to
properly balance profit maximization and social benefit, and moreover
what to do when these two things conflict.
In contrast, some argue that the duties of a director are actually more
constrained in a benefit corporation than they are in a traditional
corporation due to the business judgment rule. In ordinary course,
decisions made by a corporation’s directors are protected by the business
judgment rule, under which courts will not second-guess operating
decisions made by directors.94 Conceptually, this requires directors to be
more careful when making business decisions because they are subject to
the discretion of the statutes.95 This legal protection provides directors with
the flexibility to balance both financial and non-financial interests when
making decisions. Since the directors are afforded a broad level of
discretion, shareholders can keep this in check with their maintained
powers to sue for breach of care or loyalty.96
B.

ABANDONING DUTIES?

Critically, the public benefit corporation does not vitiate any profitmaximization duty, nor does it relax the traditional protections that
traditional corporate law provides to investors.97 But, it does allow a shift
91. Benefit Corporation Director Duties, BENEFIT CORPORATION, http://benefitcorp.net/busi
nesses/ benefit-corporation-director-duties [perma.cc/V7A8-S7DG].
92. Strine, supra note 58, at 243.
93. See generally Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of
Organization? 46 FOREST L. REV. 591 (2011).
94. Benefit Corporations are Necessary, BENEFIT CORPORATION, http://benefitcorp.net/attorneys/
benefit-corporations-are-necessary [perma.cc/V7A8-S7DG].
95. Strine, supra note 58, at 243.
96. Strine, supra note 58, at 243.
97. Strine, supra note 58, at 249.
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of power within the stockholder base, allowing the right to sue when a
director strays from profit maximization or from the corporation’s mission.
Of course, within the benefit corporation model, a director may consider
the interests of more than just the shareholders, shifting away from the
traditional profit-maximization norm established in Revlon. Under Revlon,
the board must sell to the highest bidder, maximizing the potential profit to
shareholders. 98
The Delaware Supreme Court famously held that
“regardless of its mission, a corporation may not consider social and
environmental factors in a change of control” and the “concern for nonstockholder interests is inappropriate” in the sale context.99 However, with
the establishment of benefit corporations, this duty arguably may not apply.
This is due to the fact that under benefit corporation statutes directors have
broader distraction to make decisions.100 This, in turn, gives more power to
directors who believe that a less profitable, but more socially responsible
path should be taken, even in the context of a merger or acquisition.101
Although it is still unclear how courts will evaluate a director’s decisions in
the context of a sale or merger of the company, since the law is so new in
this area and there are no case-studies as of yet.
C.

PROTECTING THE MISSION

The shift in the shareholder paradigm in a benefit corporation has a
substantial impact on the role of directors, as mentioned above. Arguably
the strongest aspect of the benefit corporation statutes is that they drive the
mission of the corporation by providing a more flexible platform designed
for pursuing both profit-seeking and for creating a social benefit.102 In this
way, the benefit corporation alleviates fears of eBay103 repeating itself by
explicitly stating that the purpose of the benefit corporation is not
shareholder wealth maximization but a “general public benefit.”104 This is
further enabled by the enhanced discretion of the board. Accordingly, the
benefit corporation gives entrepreneurs and investors a more suitable
option to achieve their objectives.105
One of the strongest arguments in support of the benefit corporation is
the maintenance of a mission.106 This is what is commonly referred to as

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173.
Reiser, supra note 93.
Strine, supra note 58, at 248.
Strine, supra note 58, at 245.
Strine, supra note 58, at 244–45.
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
Murray, supra note 3, at 493–94.
Strine, supra note 58.
Murray, supra note 3, at 507–08.

308

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 15:2

“mission stickiness,” a term that encompasses the idea that benefit
corporations are designed to reduce the amount and/or probability of any
mission-drift.107 “This mission stickiness is currently created in two ways:
the super majority vote and the benefit enforcement proceeding.”108 As
noted, most benefit corporation statutes require an affirmative vote of at
least two-thirds of the shareholders to adopt or terminate benefit
corporation status.109 Moreover, a benefit enforcement proceeding can
provide a way for shareholders to potentially prevent a transaction that
strays from the benefit corporation’s mission.110 As such, the benefit
corporation statutes can provide additional protection for risk-averse
managers and serve as a valuable warning device to possible acquirers.111
Arguably then, these statues could serve to protect benefit corporations
from potential bidders who would destroy the company’s mission, which
was the pertinent issue in the aforementioned Revlon.
i.

A Success Story: Patagonia

Since its inception in 1973, Patagonia has pursued its mission to build
the best product, to cause no unnecessary harm, and to use business to
inspire and implement solutions to the environmental crisis.112 In these
ways, Patagonia has established a mission-seeking approach to benefit both
the society and environment, even before the benefit corporation existed.
Patagonia became one of the first benefit corporations in California in
2012 after the statute was enacted and is now a premiere example for the
movement.113 Patagonia has numerous social and environmental initiatives,
including providing health care to part-time workers, providing flexible
working schedules, enforcing a code of conduct on all primary suppliers,
using primarily environmentally preferred materials, and donating one
percent of sales to environmental NGOs.114 Patagonia’s specific benefit
purpose commitments include contributing one percent of annual net
revenues to nonprofit charitable organizations that promote environmental
conservation and sustainability, to build the best product and conduct
operations causing no unnecessary harm, sharing best practices with other

107. Id.
108. Murray, supra note 3, at 507.
109. Murray, supra note 3, at 508.
110. Id.
111. Murray, supra note 3, at 488.
112. See Annual Benefit Corporation Report, PATAGONIA (Apr. 30, 2016), https://www.patagonia.
com/static/on/demandware.static/-/Library-Sites-PatagoniaShared/default/dw883f0dc2/PDF-US/2016B-CorpReport-031417.pdf [perma.cc/6T4D-Y67K].
113. Murray, supra note 3, at 486.
114. Murray, supra note 3, at 488.
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companies, transparency, and providing a supportive work environment.115
Patagonia posts its performance report for each year on its website,
available to the general public.116
Patagonia’s founder Yvon Chouinard supported the benefit
corporation movement since the beginning. While Patagonia continues to
be a privately held corporation, Chouinard, recognizes that “benefit
corporation legislation creates the legal framework to enable missiondriven companies like Patagonia to stay mission-driven through succession,
capital raises and even change in ownership.117 Chouinard, now nearly
eighty years old, relies on the benefit corporation model to keep his
company intact for years to come.118 The benefit corporation movement
provides a “clear and dependable path for business to be an agent of
positive change”, states Patagonia CEO Rose Marciano.119 In this way, the
statutes create the legal framework to enable mission-driven companies like
Patagonia to stay mission-driven through succession, capital raises, and
even changes in ownership, by institutionalizing the values, culture,
processes, and high standards put in place by founding entrepreneurs.120
Notably, in 2015 Patagonia’s sales reached a peak of $750 million,121
showing that benefit corporations can be both sustainable and profitable.
Accordingly, the benefit corporation allows “a company to act purposefully
at all stages of decision-making, balancing transparency with the need to
achieve financial gain, while also taking deliberate action to create
additional benefits for multiple stakeholders” and eliminating the “false
choice between making money and doing the right thing.”122
ii.

Improvement in the Statute

While the benefit corporation statutes contain preemptory measures to
115. Murray, supra note 3, at 486.
116. Patagonia
Works,
Annual
Benefit
Corporation
Report,
https://www.patagonia.com/static/on/demandware.static/-/Library-Sites-PatagoniaShared/
default/dw824fac0f/PDF-US/2017-BCORP-pages_022218.pdf [perma.cc/NVA8-X8AW].
117. Murray, supra note 3, at 485.
118. Daniela Siritori-Cortina, From Climber to Billionaire: How Yvon Chouinard Built Patagonia
into a Powerhouse His Own Way, FORBES (Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielasirtori/
2017/03/20/from-climber-to-billionaire-how-yvon-chouinard-built-patagonia-into-a-powerhouse-hisown-way/#11b6b66a275c [perma.cc/CDT6-TC5D].
119. Rose Marcario, Finding Moral Certainty for Businesses in an Uncertain World, PATAGONIA
(Apr. 18, 2017), https://www.patagonia.com/blog/2017/04/finding-moral-certainty-for-businesses-inan-uncertain-world/ [perma.cc/HH6P-XZ4T].
120. Patagonia registers as first public benefit corporation, CSR WIRE (Jan. 3, 2012), http://
www.csrwire.com/press_releases/33565-Patagonia-Registers-as-First-California-Benefit-Corporation
[perma.cc/3F2T-7YUU].
121. Siritori-Cortina, supra note 118.
122. Marcario, supra note 119.
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prevent mission-shift, however many argue that more can be done,
especially to protect a benefit corporation in the event it goes public. As
mentioned above, Patagonia continues to be a privately held corporation,
but academic Haskell Murray envisions a potential situation where
Patagonia would go public and would require greater protection.123
Murray argues that “mission stickiness could be improved by
amending current benefit corporation statutes and giving the statutes some
teeth by requiring a floor for corporate charitable giving and a partial asset
lock.”124 The first proposal involves imposing a mandatory floor for
corporate charitable giving.125 Notably, this is something that Patagonia
already does, giving one percent of their annual revenues to a charitable
organization of their choosing.
Murray’s other proposal is a partial asset lock for benefit corporations
to prevent companies from raising capital for a benefit corporation by
promoting themselves as a “good” company and then quickly selling to the
highest bidder.126 Arguably, the statutes could impose a lock on some
percentage of the benefit corporations assets so that this percentage of the
assets are guaranteed to be left behind, even if the corporation is bought
and has its benefit corporation status terminated. In these ways, the
corporate giving floor and the partial asset lock would ensure that the
benefit corporation’s mission was not completely abandoned.127 To date,
neither of these suggestions have been enacted in already existing benefit
corporation statutes, but they are potential food for thought, as the
movement continues to transform.
Moreover, they may be important in the analysis of the future of the
benefit corporation as companies begin to go public. Going public, refers
to the process of selling shares that were formerly privately owned to
investors for the first time. Although going public may be advantageous
for many benefit corporations to attract more capital and investment, it may
also create problems for maintaining the mission. For instance, “going
public may create pressure to realize short-term profits to maintain the
company’s stock price, causing the business to drift from its social
mission.”128 To date we have few examples of benefit corporations going
public and thus little to test the potential mission drift issue.

123. See generally Murray, supra note 3.
124. Murray, supra note 3, at 507–08.
125. Murray, supra note 3, at 511.
126. Id.
127. Murray, supra note 3, at 513.
128. Brett McDonell, Benefit Corporations and Public Markets, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (July
31, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/07/31/benefit-corporations-and-public-markets/
[per ma.cc/W87A-359Y].
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VI. THE FUTURE OF BENEFIT CORPORATIONS
As discussed above, incorporating as a benefit company is a tool to
ensure the protection of the corporation’s mission. Ultimately, becoming a
benefit corporation can “protect [the] mission through capital raises and
leadership changes, creates more flexibility when evaluating potential sale
and liquidity options, and prepares businesses to lead a mission-driven life
post-IPO.”129 It was vital for Delaware to adopt the benefit corporation
statute because it is the “domicile for a majority of American public
companies and the preferred domicile for companies seeking to go
public.”130 “The best pathway forward for benefit corporations that wish to
go public is arguably “through the use of the Delaware statute, because of
Delaware’s acceptance among institutional investors corporate managers,
and the intermediaries who raise capital.”131
Only one benefit corporation has gone public to date, so it is unclear
what the fate for these corporations will be on as public companies and
ultimately if they will be accepted by Wall Street. However, to be a viable
replacement to the traditional corporate model, the benefit corporation
statute may need to prove that it can be sustained on Wall Street.
Some commentators claim the reason why more companies have not
gone public is due to investors’ hesitancy, since the focus is not solely on
shareholder wealth maximization.132 Thus, one of the major hurdles is
raising capital and becoming more attractive to investors. One way to do
this may be by increasing market awareness and demand for the benefit
corporation.
A.

GOING PUBLIC?

In 2017, Laureate Education became the first public benefit
corporation to go public, notably it is also a certified B Corp.133 Laureate is
129. What is a Benefit Corporation?, BENEFIT CORPORATION, http://benefitcorp.net
[perma.cc/XV2H-FJAL].
130. Strine, supra, note 58, at 243.
131. Id.
132. Jing Cao and Max Chafkin, The Barbarians are at Etsy’s Hand-Hewn Responsibility Sourced
Gates, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 18, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/201705-18/the-barbarians-are-at-etsy-s-hand-hewn-responsibly-sourced-gates [perma.cc/2J56-9NSQ].
133. Press Release, CSR Wire, First Benefit Corporation Goes Public (Feb. 13, 2017), http://www.
csrwire.com/press_releases/39700-First-Benefit-Corporation-Goes-Public-Laureate-Education [perma.
cc/T2SN-VQ5T]; Lauren Gensler, The World’s Biggest For-Profit College Company, Laureate
Education, Raises $490 Million In Public Debut, FORBES (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
laurengensler/2017/02/01/laureate-education-initial-public-offering/#531b90f22b3d [perma.cc/Q3ZX5ZHE].
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the world’s largest for-profit operator of online and campus-based higher
education. It owns, controls and manages eighty-eight institutions, serving
one million students across 25 countries.134 It grew fairly rapidly and in
2014 its revenues exceeded $4.4 billion.135 It’s a 16-year-old company, but
it announced its new charter as a Delaware Benefit Corporation in 2015.136
Laureate and its shareholders, have “rejected the market paradigm of
‘shareholder primacy’ by going public as a new type of corporate entity
specifically designed to treat customers, employees and communities as the
shareholders’ partners, rather than as interests to be managed for maximum
financial gain.”137 Before going public, Laureate’s initial investors
included groups such as Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR), one of the
world’s largest private equity firms, Point 72, another venture capital giant,
and International Finance Corp., a private-sector arm of the World Bank.138
Laureate CEO and founder, Doug Becker, made it clear that his company’s
only goal will not be making a profit, and that the company seeks to
“balance the needs of stockholders with the needs of students, employees
and communities in which we operate.”139 Laureate raised $490 million
from investors in its initial public offering (“IPO”).140 The Laureate IPO is
considered to be a roadmap for individual and institutional investors who
want to invest capital in businesses that generate strong returns and make
valuable contributions to society at large.
Before Laureate Education, Etsy, a certified B Corp, went public in
2015, its IPO valuing the company at $3.38 billion.141 Etsy’s mission is
“commitment to having a positive social, economic and environmental
impact.”142 While Etsy has maintained its B Corp status, which it retained
in 2012, it has not yet incorporated as a benefit corporation. But, it may
need to in order to maintain its B Corp status. B Lab requires companies
incorporated in states with benefit corporation laws to comply with their
home states’ standards to maintain their B Corp status; a company has four
134.
135.
136.

CSR, supra note 133.
Id.; Gensler, supra note 133.
Brad Edmonson, The First Benefit Corporation IPO is Coming and That’s a Big Deal,
TRIPLE PUNDIT (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.triplepundit.com/2016/02/first-benefit-corporation-ipocoming-tha ts-big-deal/ [perma.cc/L6CP-LWPH].
137. Id. Press Release, CSR Wire, First Benefit Corporation Goes Public (Feb. 13, 2017), http://
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[perma.cc/D62C-VV75].
138. Edmonson, supra note 136.
139. Id.; see also McDonell, supra note 128.
140. Gensler, supra note 133.
141. Jackie Marcus and Peri Shweiger, Etsy and the B Corp IPO, Sustainability Meets Wall Street,
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years from the date the legislation is passed to comply with state law or risk
losing B Corp certification.143 Etsy is incorporated in Delaware, where the
benefit corporation statute passed in 2013, but with an amended statute
released in 2015, B Lab is allowing Etsy until August of 2019 to reincorporate, without losing its B Corp certification status.144
Nevertheless, Etsy has shown that it is possible for a company that
values commitments beyond shareholder maximization to be a publicly
traded company.145 Unfortunately, Etsy did not have a great first year after
going public; the share price dropped from $35.74 a share at its IPO to
$8.32 a share, nearly eighty percent,146 but is trading at over $60 a share as
of 2019. However, failing to incorporate as a benefit corporation could put
Etsy at risk for potential mission-drift and susceptible to being purchased
by a hostile bidder. Furthermore, as a public company, Etsy faces greater
scrutiny from investors on how much it prioritizes its “noble pursuits over
its bottom line.”147
It is too early to say what the future for Laureate Education or Etsy
will be as public companies. While they have shown that it is possible to
maintain a mission and a profit and to balance multiple constituencies
including shareholders, their success cannot be applauded yet.
Accordingly, lawyers, entrepreneurs and investors will be watching to see
whether Wall Street will come to embrace other publicly traded companies
with a social benefit mandate.148
B.

INCREASED INVESTMENT

One of the major gaps to fill is funding for these companies, and more
specially impact investing, sometimes referred to Socially Responsible
Investing (“SRI”). “Impact investments are those made to companies,
organizations, and funds with the intention to generate social and
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fastcompany.com/40418325/will-etsy-keep-its-commitment-to-social-good-after-its-management-shak
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environmental impact alongside a financial return.”149 Like the premise
behind the social enterprise movement, it “challenges the long-held views
that social and environmental issues should be addressed only by
philanthropic donations, and that market investments should focus
exclusively on achieving financial returns.”150 A 2010 report by J.P.
Morgan, titled “Impact Investments: An Emerging Asset Class”, states that
impact investing has gained traction among a wide range of investors,
including large-scale financial institutions, pension funds, family offices,
private wealth mangers, foundations, individuals, commercial banks, and
development finance institutions.151 The report estimates the size of this
market opportunity in impact investments to be between $400 billion and
$1 trillion.152 This estimate includes investment opportunities in emerging
markets across five sectors: housing, rural water delivery, maternal health,
primary education, and services.153 Likewise, the 2016 Report on US
Sustainable, Responsible and Impact Investment Trends shows a thirtythree percent increase in the preceding two years, and a fourteen-fold
increase since 1995.154 In fact, from 2012 to 2014, the number of U.S.
investment funds that incorporated environmental, governmental or social
criteria increased by twenty-eight percent and their assets quadrupled to
more than $4.3 trillion.155 The 2016 report also shows that SRI investing
continues to expand—now accounting for more than one out of every five
dollars under professional management.
Of course, one of the driving forces behind the SRI investment trend
are millennials.156 One study showed that two-thirds of those aged 22 to 34
are likely to invest in a company well-known for its social responsibility.157
Indeed, studies suggest that as the millennial generation gets older, SRI
149. What You Need To Know About Impact Investing, Global Impact Investing Network, https://
thegiin.org/impact-investing/need-to-know/#s1 [perma.cc/QLY3-CCLJ].
150. Id.
151. Impact Investing: An Emerging Asset Class, JP MORGAN (Nov. 29, 2010), https://www.
jpmorganchase.com/corporate/socialfinance/document/impact_investments_nov2010.pdf
[perma.cc/LN9Z-KNJU].
152. Id.
153. Michael Iachini, Socially Responsible Investing Comes of Age, CHARLES SCHWAB (May 11,
2017), https://www.schwab.com/resource-center/insights/content/socially-responsible-investing-comesage [perma.cc/Z3U3-H8UV].
154. See Report on US Sustainable, Responsible, and Impact Investing Trends, THE FORUM FOR
SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT (2016), https://www.ussif.org/trends [perma.cc/5BKU2YQB].
155. Id.
156. Ben Schiller, As Wealthy Millennials Take Control of Family Fortune Impact Investing is Set
for a Big Boost, FAST COMPANY (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.fastcompany.com/40466206/aswealthy-millennials-take-control-of-family-fortunes-impact-investing-is-set-for-a-big-boost [perma.cc/C6SPGWJ6].
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investment will continue to grow as millennial investors are two times as
likely as the overall investor population to invest in companies targeting
social or environmental goals.158 “Benefit corps create an attractive
investment opportunity for the same conscious consumers that have fueled
organics, fair trade, and “buy local” movements, while enjoying a form of
inoculation from the short-termism that plagues public equity markets.”159
This could be a good sign for the benefit corporation movement,
which will likely be fueled by a younger generation of investors. Investing
in a benefit corporation gives impact investors the assurance they need that
they will be able to hold a company accountable to its mission in the
future.160
C.

MARKET DEMAND

Another form of drive for the social enterprise movement is the
increase in market demand for these types of companies. Notably,
consumer consciousness is on the rise, wielding influence on business like
never before.161 “In fact, ninety percent of global consumers are likely to
switch to a brand associated with a good cause.”162 Increasing awareness
on issues—such as equal pay, environmentally conscious manufacturing
processes, prevention of counterfeit goods and/or human trafficking,
responsible farming practices and overproduction of goods—has led to a
rise in what is known as conscious consumption, a movement of people,
who seek out ways to make positive decisions about what to buy and look
for a solution to the negative impact consumerism is having on our
world.163 A survey done by YouGov and the Global Poverty Project,
concluded that “three-quarters of consumers would pay an extra five
percent for clothes manufactured under fair and safe working conditions”,
while a Nielsen survey found that “a global majority would be willing to
pay more for products or services provided by companies that are
158. Millennials Drive Growth in Sustainable Investing, MORGAN STANLEY (Aug. 9, 2017), http://
www.morganstanley.com/ideas/sustainable-socially-responsible-investing-millennials-drive-growth.
html [perma.cc/CF7K-LUDS].
159. Id.
160. Why is the Benefit Corp Right for me? Benefit Corporation, http://benefitcorp.net/
businesses/why-become-benefit-corp [perma.cc/5ANU-JYG9].
161. The Rise of the Corporate Consumer, BUSINESS MATTERS (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.
bmmagazine.co.uk/in-business/advice/rise-conscious-consumer/ [perma.cc/6GPB-ARBU].
162. Americans Willing to Buy or Boycott Companies Based On Corporate Values, According to
New Research by Cone Communications, CONE COMMUNICATIONS (May 17, 2017), http://www.cone
comm.com/news-blog/2017/5/15/americans-willing-to-buy-or-boycott-companies-based-on-corporatevalues-according-to-new-research-by-cone-communications [perma.cc/Q29H-REYG].
163. Jessi Baker, The Rise of the Conscious Consumer: Why Businesses Need to Open Up, THE
GUARDIAN (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/women-in-leadership/2015/apr/02/the-rise-ofthe-conscious-consumer-why-businesses-need-to-open-up [perma.cc/GVU5-SJC4].
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committed to positive social and environmental impact.”164 In the latter
group, millennials comprised fifty-one percent of sampling.165 Indeed,
millennials may be a huge driving force behind the social enterprise
movement in the future. “If you look at the millennials’ point of view, they
want to know the company behind a brand, its values, and what it does for
society and the community.”166
Accelerating consumer demand has resulted in the formation of a
substantial marketplace for companies that are using the power of business
to solve social problems.167 It is likely that this increased consumer
consciousness will be a substantial driving force behind the benefit
corporation movement. Thus, businesses should seek to take advantage of
this market of conscious consumers who no longer hold traditional utility
preferences, as the public and millennials, in particular, continue to drive
and demand social entrepreneurship.
D.

HOW CAN WE DO MORE

As suggested above, market and investor support is necessary to
continue the growth of the benefit corporation movement. At a macro
level, local and federal government backing could provide the boost to
social entrepreneurs, investors, and to consumers to grow the movement
fully. That is to say that if we, as a society, value corporations that provide
a social benefit or good in a sustainable way, it may be necessary to invest
in infrastructure to support them.
i.

Government Support

There are three methods in which the government may provide
support to the benefit corporation movement. There is little research done
on the potential success of these methods, therefore this note will only be
able to hypothesize the realities of implementing them.
First, in order to attract more entrepreneurs to the benefit corporation,
the government could provide tax breaks to these businesses. Providing
financial support may help social enterprises that are struggling to make a
profit succeed. However, academics have argued that extending non-profit
164. Global Consumers are Willing to Put Their Money Where Their Heart Is, NIELSON (June 17,
2014), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/press-room/2014/global-consumers-are-willing-to-put-their-mon
ey-where-their-heart-is.html [perma.cc/NA7K-2TDY]; Shosanna Delventhal, How Consumers Are
Changing Business, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 16, 2015), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/
investing/091615/how-conscious-consumers-are-changing-business.asp#ixzz4yvJZTBci
[perma.cc/7ZP4-W5PT].
165. Global Consumers, supra note 164.
166. The Rise of the Conscious Consumer, MEDIUM, https://medium.com/future-of/the-rise-of-theconscious-consumer-bcc5235cb80d [perma.cc/AUG6-3UXJ].
167. See Babson & Clark, supra note 24, at 820.
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type tax benefits to social enterprises could threaten the very benefits that
their creators sough to create, as well as having a deleterious effect on the
charitable sector itself.168 A forgiving tax structure, they argue, may “place
a substantial and likely unsustainable burden on the federal government to
ensure that profitmaking does not trump providing public benefit, and
threaten to undermine public support both for hybrid forms and for the
existing tax preferences enjoyed by nonprofits.”169
However, with additional reporting and transparency requirements,
providing tax breaks for public benefit corporations could serve as a
substantial catalyst for the creation of more socially-motivated entities.
Nevertheless, to be effective the enforcement mechanisms will need to be
more stringent, and greater transparency will be necessary.
Second, there could be reduced taxes on sustainably sourced and
manufactured goods proposed both on a local or state level. This effort
would attempt to influence market consumers to into buying these goods.
A reduced sales tax on goods which are manufactured in a sustainable way
or by a certified B Corp may help to supplement these enterprises and to
ensure their financial growth. This can be seen as a direct opposite
approach to what is called a “sin” tax,170 in which the government taxes
‘bad behaviors’ to deter consumers from engaging in them. For instance,
the government places higher taxes on goods and behaviors which they do
not want to support and want to sway consumers away from buying, such
as on cigarettes. Therefore, what is to say that the government should not
be decreasing taxes on goods that provide a social benefit or are produced
in a sustainable way. This is completely hypothetical, but in an ideal world
could be used to increase the purchasing of goods from companies that are
incorporated as public benefit corporations.
Finally, local level governments can provide greater support to benefit
corporations. This is being done in some cities in the form of awarding city
contracts to benefit corporations. For example, the cities of Philadelphia
and San Francisco give preferential treatment to benefit corporations, in
hiring these benefit corporations for various city project contracts.171
While arguably the first two proposals are somewhat lofty and could
result in an uphill political battle, at the very least local governments could
provide support for benefit corporations. Indeed, if sustainable and socially
168. See Joseph R. Ganahl and Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66 STAN. L. REV.
387, 442 (2014).
169. Id. at 387.
170. See generally Do Sin Taxes Really Change Consumer Behavior? WHARTON BUS. SCHOOL.
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/do-sin-taxes-really-change-consumer-behavior/
[perma.cc/4JS2-UAK2].
171. Murray, supra note 3, at 511.
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motivated manufacturing and goods are truly something valued by our
society, then benefit corporations may be something worth investing in.

VII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Lawyers, academics, entrepreneurs, CEOs, and the public at large
have taken small steps to support the rise of social enterprises. Following
global economic crisis and greater demands for corporate responsibility,
the public support for companies that ‘do good’ is unprecedented. Today,
corporations can be designed in a way to create profit while also
maintaining a public benefit and doing so in a sustainable way. Through
the establishment of the benefit corporation, it has now became a reality for
corporations to be able to support constituencies other than their
shareholders. Indeed, benefit corporations “have the potential to change
the accountability structure within which managers operate by creating
incremental reform that puts actual power behind the idea that corporations
should do the right thing.”172
When the benefit corporation statute was passed in California in 2012,
Patagonia’s founder stated, “I hope five or ten years from now, we’ll look
back on this day and say this was the start of a revolution, because the
existing paradigm isn’t working anymore. This is the future.”173 Now that
it’s been nearly seven years, it is safe to say that this vision has advanced,
with the spread of social enterprise and the creation of the benefit
corporation statute in half of the fifty states. However, the movement has
not yet garnered the support necessary to make a real impact on society.
Indeed, only time will tell whether the benefit corporation will be strong
enough to sustain itself and prove to be a replacement the traditional
corporate model.
Nevertheless, the benefit corporation model shows true promise for the
future of business leaders and investors, as it provides an alternative to the
traditional corporate and business profit-seeking model. In an ideal world,
through the influence of social enterprise and the market demand by
conscious consumers, all corporations will be designed to fulfill a public
good, to promote sustainability, and to create a fair and just economy.
However, until that point, the benefit corporation can serve to support social
enterprises and the growth of socially conscious business practices, which
can provide for a more sustainable and efficient society.
***
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173.

Strine, supra note 58, at 235.
Gunther, supra note 21.

